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The Response refers to the presentation “The Responsibility to Protect. A 
Perspective from the Global South” by Siddharth Mallavarapu. It challenges the 
presentation on its critique of the post-colonial structures of the concept of R2P 
and brings the idea of “just peace” into relation with R2P 
 




This response refers to the presentation of Siddharth Mallavarapu who presented his 
perspective under the title: “The Responsibility to Protect: A Perspective from the Global 
South”. In the presentation Mallavarapu shared his Indian perspective on one of the relatively 
new and challenging developments of the UN security policies: the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P). One of the core points of his presentation was that R2P must be seen and understood in 
relation to “a longer history of interventionism and the broader culpability of major powers in 
both sustaining and perpetuating inequalities” and that R2P is much messier in the real world 
than in textbooks. 
In this paper I want to make three points: first I will refer to those parts where I agree with 
what Siddharth Mallavarapu was saying but where I also see challenges, my second point will 
be aspects where I have probably a different perspective and my third point will be trying to 
bring Mallavarapu’s perspective to terms with a theological approach and my “Northern” 
perspective, being a German, Protestant theologian and economist. 
The Unfairness of Global Political and Economic Structures and the Problem of 
the Mis-use of R2P 
The Unfairness of Global Economic and Political Structures 
One of Mallavarapu’s important points of critique of R2P is that it is “part of an older and 
much wider global history of intervention” and that it is “burdened by the past” and that it is 
in a way continuing old power structures. Mallavarapu states in an interview: “I have recently 
intervened on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine and its practice. I have been rather 
critical arguing that it cannot be disassociated  from a longer history of interventionism by the 
majority powers in the global south however its dressing. A thread that runs through my work 
is to demonstrate how historical asymmetry continues to manifest in terms of how the 
contemporary international system is structured.” (Creutzfeld 2014, 8). I think this is an 
important point to discuss about: 
Understanding Siddharth Mallavarpu’s critique as a general critique on the unfairness of 
global political and economic structures, I think this is an absolutely right observation. 
Looking at power structures on the global level and looking at global institutions like the 
United Nations and especially the Security Council, the questions of fairness in the sense of 
modes and forms of participation of everybody or at least every state involved in decision 
processes etc. is an important point (see for the discussion on the structures of the UN, e.g. 
Schmitt 2013). The questions which global unjust political and economic structures have to 
do with colonialism and which other reasons are to be mentioned opens up another important 
point on the perseverance of historical events into the present which I do not want to comment 
on here since more and detailed analysis are needed. But I have the following questions: Are 
the colonial power structures in the post-colonial forms really manifest in the formation and 
structure of the Responsibility to Protect concept? As far as I have seen, the formation and the 
structure of the R2P has been developed in an international way which does not make the 
impression that R2P - as a concept – is the expression of the will of former or present day 
empires (Luck 2013). It was the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) under the leadership of Canada which developed the idea in 2001 in their 
publication “The Responsibility to Protect” (ICISS 2001). In 2005 the concept was accepted 
by the whole General Assembly of the UN (Bellamy 2015, 14). So I would like to know more 
where exactly Mallavarapu sees post-colonial structures already in the concept? And my other 
point is: even if the concept of R2P has been developed in this unfair world, I think, we still 
can use it and develop it further. Just because it has been created in this context, this does not 
disqualify it per se. 
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The Mis-use of the R2P 
Another important point of Mallavarapu’s critique is - what I will call - the mis-use of the 
concept of the Responsibility to Protect, especially in the way the concept is administered, 
implemented and applied.  
If we look at the case of Libya as the first official reference to the concept of R2P at an 
armed intervention we can see the problems: the mandate was formulated very open and there 
were statesmen like the French president who declared that a change of the political regime 
has to be the aim of the intervention although this is not part of the statutes of R2P. The 
abstention of Germany concerning the vote on the resolution 1973 on the 17th of March 2011 
shows the complicated interpretation of the situation in Libya and the interwovenness of 
national and international politics (Seibel 2013, 87). “Though few doubt that the international 
community’s swift action in Libya averted a massacre in Benghazi, the manner in which 
NATO and its allies enforced Resolution 1973 proved deeply controversial. Many 
governments and commentators argued that the alliance exceeded the mandate it had been 
given by the UN Security Council.” (Bellamy 2015, 187). As we have seen, it is important to 
distinguish the concept, its theoretical level, its ethical demand and the level of its 
implantation which has to be improved (Deitelhoff 2013, 23f.). Alex J. Bellamy expresses this 
point: “Ultimately a principle can be used and abused by skilled diplomats to satisfy almost 
any political agenda. The real test for the R2P is whether it can be transformed into a program 
of action which delivers real protection to civilians in peril” (Bellamy 2009, 199). And it is 
definitely not enough only to consider responsibility because this concept needs more 
normative grounding in justice issues, e.g., since there is also the tendency of responsibility to 
paternalism. Therefore, for example, the organization of the concept has to be done in a way 
that it is not paternalizing, by referring to the local people, analyzing the actual situation 
thoroughly etc.  
The Strengths of the R2P 
The Starting Point: The Victims 
One of the strengths of R2P is that its starting point lies with the human beings who are 
violated in their human rights having become victims of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing (Enns 2013, 103). The three “pillars” of the R2P refer to the 
situation of those in need: “(1) the primary responsibility of states to protect their own 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and 
from the their incitement; (2) the duty of states to assist each other to build the capacity 
necessary to discharge the first responsibility; (3) the international community’s responsibility 
to take timely and decisive action to protect populations from the four crimes when the state 
in question fails to do so.” (Bellamy 2015, 2f.). The underlying moral concept of this 
responsibility does not only refer to an ethics of care but starts from a cosmopolitan 
perspective that each individual has the right to a decent life and that there are global duties to 
help (Rudolf 2013, 14). There is a universalism in this concept, but using the idea that 
everybody in a situation as a victim wants help, I think that this is a strong argument to agree 
that there exist duties of the whole humankind to protect also the ones which are not citizens 
of one’s own state but who belong to humanity around the globe. Although it has to be taken 
into account that on the level of implementation of R2P there are difficulties. 
The Subsidiarity Character and the Multi-Facets of the R2P 
The three “pillars” of R2P can also be interpreted as three levels and R2P as a subsidiarity 
principle. Therefore, if the “level” of the state is not able to help to protect its citizens itself, 
there is the international community as the next level to act. This subsidiarity structure has to 
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be understood as levels of responsibility. There are further questions of the information flow 
and who has the power of the deliberations in executing R2P in its detailed actions. There are 
also the questions who has got the power to decide and on which level these decisions are 
taken and also the questions of fairness arise.  
But the concept does not only have the subsidiarity structure, it has also multiple facets of 
action: At least in its primary version of 2001 it emphasizes the need for prevention and the 
need of protection in its different forms, - not only in a military way - and also after the 
interventions the need to rebuild structures. Taking this whole process into account is a 
strength of the R2P. 
Responsibility as the Character of Sovereignty and the Role of Collective Responsibility 
The strength and the difficulty of the concept is the idea of a collective responsibility not only 
of states but of humankind, in its form as the “international community”, that in cases of 
violation against human rights this responsibility is stronger than the single state sovereignty. 
For me, from an ethical point of view, the interesting part is the role of responsibility in this 
concept. It challenges traditional understandings of responsibility as something on an 
individual level and even on the state level. R2P refers to the responsibility of the state which 
is grounded in legal as well as moral responsibility but it goes further to refer to the 
responsibility of the international community. Up to now this is more a moral responsibility 
than a legal one due to the fact that we do not have a proper and sophisticated international 
legal framework. And here begin the difficulties like the legitimization of taking up the 
responsibility to protect beyond the state: who is obliged to do it: the UN, the NATO, NGOs 
etc (Evans 2008, 175ff.)? Another important point is also the question, in order to be able to 
take up collective responsibility you need to have enough information to judge the situation 
adequately.  
How can collective responsibility be understood? The theological ethicist Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer while analyzing how to live responsibly came up with the idea that responsibility 
has a fourfold structure. For him, as a theologian, it is grounded in the responsibility before 
God and in Christ and in this sense is a vicarious representative action, it is a deed which 
needs courage in accordance with reality, in order to be responsible one needs freedom and 
also taking on guilt belongs for him to responsibility (Bonhoeffer 2009, 274f.). Taking this as 
a vantage point for the ideas about collective responsibility in the context of R2P, we need to 
ask who are the responsible actors and what is their legitimization (Hofmann 2013). It is also 
important to see that responsibility alone as an idea to structure the tasks of protection is not 
enough: the concept of  collective responsibility has to be set into relation with freedom as 
well as with justice issues, so that, e.g., paternalism does not prevail. But this would be 
another presentation, so I stop here and want to bring in another point which might lead the 
discussion a bit further. 
The Concept of “Just Peace” and the R2P 
I just want to say a few words about the theological discussions of R2P and the grounding 
idea of just peace in the “Denkschrift” of the Protestant Church of Germany as an example. I 
got the impression that there are similarities between the idea of “just peace” and Siddharth 
Mallavarapu’s critique in the point of raising issues of justice in international relations and the 
R2P. In the ecumenical peace ethics discussion the approach of a “just peace” has become 
central. The idea behind this concept is that just war theory is not useful anymore for our 
present day situation, because there are power structures and injustices which have to be 
addressed as well and that there is the urgent need to bring justice issues and peace issues 
together. In the idea of “just peace” the non-violent tradition of Christian thinking is 
emphasized as well as the importance of prevention. The Protestant Church of Germany in its 
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Denkschrift “Aus Gottes Frieden leben – für gerechten Frieden sorgen” (EKD 2007) describes 
the following elements which characterize “just peace”: it is the protection from violence, the 
support of freedom, the reduction of despair and the support of cultural plurality. It is 
combined with the relevance of the law and the importance of legal structures and an ethics in 
which the use of violence is in accordance with democratic law (Haspel 2011, 139f). The core 
element is the idea that violence must be prevented and that justice is an important element to 
prevent violence (Hoppe 2011, 62f.). In this sense, the idea of “just peace” supports the non-
violent and prevention sides of the responsibility to protect although it is still open towards 
the possibility to use violence as ultima ratio after checking different criteria. Concerning the 
R2P in its present form, R2P lacks clearer criteria which could be further developed from the 
ISICC document in relation to a “just peace” concept. The churches themselves are on their 
way of analyzing R2P from a pacifist and a “just peace” point of view. In its statement on the 
way to just peace, the General Assembly of the 10th convention of the World Council of 
Churches in Busan in November 2013 declared concerning the R2P: a. “Undertake, in 
cooperation with member churches and specialized ministries, critical analysis of the 
“Responsibility to Prevent, React and Rebuild” and its relationship to just peace, and its 
misuse to justify armed interventions” (WCC 2013). The just peace approach and R2P can be 
put into further fruitful relation. But from this background the question remains, concerning 
the emphasis on the prevention of violence: is it too idealistic to put the focus on the non-
violence and prevention side of the R2P because also non-violent interventions and 
humanitarian help can be abused? How is a “just peace” approach in a violent world possible 
(Enns 2012, 233f.)? Can R2P be developed further by structuring and modifying it to become 
a more successful instrument to promote peace and justice? 
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